Operation Barbarossa 1941.

This article was created by  on Imgur and is reposted here with his permission.
A German infantryman walks toward the body of a killed Soviet soldier and a burning BT-7 light tank in the southern Soviet Union in in 1941, during the early days of Operation Barbarossa. Operation Barbarossa (Unternehmen Barbarossa) was the German codename for Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II, which commenced on June 22, 1941. It was to be the turning point for the fortunes of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich, in that the failure of Operation Barbarossa arguably resulted in the eventual overall defeat of Nazi Germany. The Eastern Front, which was opened by Operation Barbarossa, would become the biggest theater of war in World War II, with some of the largest and most brutal battles, terrible loss of life, and miserable conditions for Russians and Germans alike.

An Sd.Kfz-250 half-track in front of German tank units, as they prepare for an attack, on July 21, 1941, somewhere along the Russian warfront, during the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In August 1939, as Europe slid towards another world war, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression treaty. The Nazi-Soviet Pact came as a complete surprise to other nations, given the ideological differences between the two countries. It ushered in a period of military co-operation which allowed Hitler to ignore western diplomatic moves and invade Poland. Stalin’s forces then attacked from the east and completed the subjugation and partition of the Polish state. For the next year and a half Germany also benefitted economically from the arrangement, with Russia exporting grain and oil in return for manufactured goods.
A German half-track driver inside an armored vehicle in Russia in August of 1941. Soviet cooperation allowed Hitler to expand his plans for European domination. In May 1940 the Blitzkrieg rolled westwards and France was conquered in six weeks. But peace with Russia would not last. Hitler had always wanted to see Germany expand eastwards to gain Lebensraum or ‘living space’ for its people. After the fall of France Hitler ordered plans to be drawn up for an invasion of the Soviet Union. He intended to destroy what he saw as Stalin’s ‘Jewish Bolshevist’ regime and establish Nazi hegemony. The conquest and enslavement of the Soviet Union’s racially ‘inferior’ Slavic populations would be part of a grand plan of ‘Germanisation’ and economic exploitation lasting well beyond the expected military victory. Regardless of recent economic and political co-operation, the Soviet Union was regarded as the natural enemy of Nazi Germany and a key strategic objective.
German Stuka dive-bombers, in flight heading towards their target over coastal territory between Dniepr and Crimea, towards the Gate of the Crimea on November 6, 1941. After a five week delay while operations in Greece and Yugoslavia were completed, Operation ‘Barbarossa’ – named after the all-conquering Medieval Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I – was launched on 22 June 1941. Over three and a half million German and other Axis troops attacked along a 1,800-mile front. A total of 148 divisions – 80 per cent of the German Army – were committed to the enterprise. Seventeen panzer divisions, formed into four Panzer Groups, formed the vanguard with 3,400 tanks. They were supported by 2,700 aircraft of the Luftwaffe. It was the largest invasion force to date.
German soldiers cross a river, identified as the Don river, in a stormboat, sometime in 1941, during the German invasion of the Caucasus region in the Soviet Union. The German forces were split into three army groups, each with a specific objective. Army Group North was to head through the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and take Leningrad. Army Group South would attack into the Ukraine towards Kiev and the Donbas (Donets Basin) industrial region. Between them, Army Group Centre’s objective was Minsk, Smolensk and then Moscow itself. Hitler expected these all to be attained in approximately ten weeks.
German soldiers move a horse-drawn vehicle over a corduroy road while crossing a wetland area, in October 1941, near Salla on Kola Peninsula, a Soviet-occupied region in northeast Finland. The Soviets had massed large forces on their western frontier, but they were under orders not to provoke the Germans. Although mistrustful of Hitler, Stalin did not believe that he would attack so soon, despite the ominous German build-up and a stream of intelligence warnings. He had some 5 million men available immediately and a total of 23,000 tanks, but the Red Army was still unprepared when the Germans struck. The Germans got off to a good start, with the panzer groups quickly pushing towards their objectives and Russian forces falling apart in confusion. They were greatly helped by the Luftwaffe’s bombing of Soviet airfields, artillery positions and troop concentrations. The Germans quickly established air superiority. On the first day alone 1,800 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, most of them on the ground. Army Group North, under Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, plunged towards Leningrad, with General Erich Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 in the lead. Russian forces in this sector were thinly spread and the panzers covered 500 miles (804 km) in three weeks. By mid-July they were only 60 miles (96 km) from their objective.
With a burning bridge across the Dnieper river in the background, a German sentry keeps watch in the recently-captured city of Kiev, in 1941 Army Group Centre, under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, also made rapid progress. By 28 June Panzer Group 2, led by General Heinz Guderian, and General Hermann Hoth’s Panzer Group 3 had encircled three Russian armies and captured over 320,000 men in the Bialystok-Minsk pockets. The two panzer groups then pressed ahead, linking up on the far side of Smolensk on 27 July in another double envelopment. Two more Russian armies were trapped and destroyed, and another 300,000 troops taken prisoner. Army Group South, under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, had the furthest to go and his attack also faced the stiffest Soviet resistance. Most of the Russian armour was on this front. But by early July von Rundstedt had pushed out beyond the pre-1939 Polish frontier. General Ewald von Kleist’s Panzer Group 1 was slowed by Soviet flanking attacks as it headed for Kiev, the capital of Ukraine and key to the coal-rich Donets Basin. On 8 August the Germans surrounded two Soviet armies, capturing 100,000 men in the Uman pocket, and reached the Dnieper River. The naval port of Odessa on the Black Sea was also besieged.
Machine gunners of the far eastern Red Army in the USSR, during the German invasion of 1941 Up to this point all seemed to be going well, the only major problem being the time needed for the infantry to catch up with the panzers and mop up pockets of Russian defence. But Soviet resistance was now stiffening, despite catastrophic losses. A German salient around Yelnya, south-east of Smolensk, was recaptured in a costly but successful counterattack. Meanwhile, Army Group Centre’s supply situation was becoming critical. Hitler decided to halt the advance on Moscow and reinforce Army Groups North and South. Hoth’s Panzer Group 3 was sent north to support the drive on Leningrad while Guderian’s tanks were despatched to help Army Group South take Kiev. The German High Command protested vigorously. The panzers were only 220 miles from Moscow. But Hitler regarded the resource-rich Ukraine as more important. On 21 August he ordered that the conquest of the Crimea and the Donets Basin be given priority.
A German bomber, with its starboard engine on fire, goes down over an unknown location, during World War II, in November, 1941. The Soviets were completely fooled by German moves. Five Soviet armies were trapped in a vast salient around Kiev. As usual, Stalin refused to sanction a withdrawal before the pocket was sealed. By the end of September Kiev had fallen and over 650,000 Russian troops killed or captured. The Germans pushed along the Black Sea coast and into the Crimea, laying siege to Sevastapol. In October Kharkov fell, but by now the Germans were exhausted. The fighting had severely depleted their ranks and supply lines were stretched to the limit. For now, the southern front stayed where it was. In the north too, German forces had reached their limit. In September, with the aid of their Finnish Allies, they cut Leningrad off from the rest of Russia, but lacked the strength to take the city. Instead, Hitler ordered that it be starved into submission. The epic siege would last 890 days. Hitler now decided to resume the battle for Moscow. On 2 October he unleashed Operation ‘Typhoon’. He believed the Russians had been fatally weakened and lacked the strength to defend their capital – one more push would see it fall and victory would be his. But the Red Army had been reinforced. Almost a million Soviet troops were in place, although they had few tanks and aircraft left. A multi-layered ring of defences had been thrown around the capital and its citizens had been mobilised. The German offensive was carried out by a reinforced Army Group Centre, comprising three infantry armies and three panzer groups – 1 million men and 1,700 tanks. However the Luftwaffe was weak after over three months of sustained operations. And the weather was beginning to turn.
Nazi troops lie concealed in the undergrowth during the fighting prior to the capture of Kiev, Ukraine, in 1941. Once again the initial assault was a success. The panzer divisions stormed ahead and over 600,000 Russian soldiers were captured in two more huge encirclements near the cities of Bryansk and Vyazma. The Russians were down to about 90,000 men. But as they reached the approaches to Moscow, the German formations slowed to a crawl. Autumn rains had turned the dirt roads into rivers of mud. It was the Rasputitsa – the ‘quagmire season’ – and wheeled and horse-drawn transport became hopelessly stuck. The Germans chose to temporarily halt operations. In mid-November, with the temperature dropping and the ground now frozen hard, the panzers attempted a final pincer attack around Moscow itself. The delay had given the Soviets time to bring in further reinforcements, including reservists and troops from Siberia and the eastern borders. The northern German pincer was the most successful and got within 12 miles of the city. German officers could see the Kremlin buildings through their field glasses. The Germans also tried attacking in the centre, along the Minsk-Moscow road. On 2 December a reconnaissance unit got within 5 miles of Moscow. Though tantalisingly close, this was the limit of the entire advance. The depleted German units were exhausted and frozen into inactivity in the deep snow. On 5 December the Soviets launched a surprise counter-offensive. The Germans were forced into a retreat, despite Hitler’s call to defend every foot of ground. Guderian and several other senior generals who advised withdrawal were sacked. The Russians succeeded in crushing various German formations in encirclements of their own. The Luftwaffe struggled to operate but performed vital work ferrying supplies to cut off units and harrying the Russian advance. Army Group Centre was pushed back up to 150 miles from Moscow. A furious Hitler dismissed the commander-in-chief of the German Army, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, and appointed himself in his place.
Evidence of Soviet resistance in the streets of Rostov, a scene in late 1941, encountered by the Germans as they entered the heavily besieged city. Why Operation ‘Barbarossa’ failed? Operation ‘Barbarossa’ had clearly failed. Despite the serious losses inflicted on the Red Army and extensive territorial gains, the mission to completely destroy Soviet fighting power and force a capitulation was not achieved. One of the most important reasons for this was poor strategic planning. The Germans had no satisfactory long-term plan for the invasion. They mistakenly assumed that the campaign would be a short one, and that the Soviets would give in after suffering the shock of massive initial defeats. Hitler had assured the High Command that ‘We have only to kick in the front door and the whole rotten edifice will come tumbling down’. But Russia was not France. The shock value of the initial Blitzkrieg was dissipated by the vast distances, logistical difficulties and Soviet troop numbers, all of which caused attritional losses of German forces which could not be sustained.
Russian soldiers, left, hands clasped to heads, marched back to the rear of the German lines on July 2, 1941, as a column of Nazi troops move up to the front at the start of hostilities between Germany and Russia. The impact of Hitler’s involvement. Hitler’s input has been heavily criticised, not least by his generals at the time. Moscow was always a more important objective to the German High Command than it was to Hitler, who was more concerned with destroying Soviet field armies and capturing vital industrial resources. His switching of the main thrust from the central front to Leningrad in the north and Ukraine in the south was to an extent militarily sensible given the weakness of Army Group Centre after the Smolensk battles and the threats to its flanks. Indeed, the diversion actually worked in the Germans’ favour since it surprised the Soviets and resulted in the destruction of huge Soviet forces around Kiev. But it also threw away Germany’s only real chance of outright victory. The early capture of Moscow would have had an undeniable psychological impact and may have been the tipping point. Guderian in particular believed that using the panzers in traditional encirclement battles played into Russian hands and gave them chances to bring forward fresh reserves. He had advocated an all-out drive on the capital. But when Hitler resumed the assault with Operation ‘Typhoon’ it was too late. The German Army was now fatally weakened, the weather had worsened and Soviet reinforcements had arrived.
Russian men and women rescue their humble belongings from their burning homes, said to have been set on fire by the Russians, part of a scorched-earth policy, in a Leningrad suburb on October 21, 1941. Soviet tank superiority. While the Germans underestimated the military potential of their opponents, they also exaggerated the capabilities of their own forces, most significantly the four Panzer Groups. The panzer divisions were the principal weapon of Blitzkrieg and at that time were far superior to the Soviets in training, leadership and tactical ability. But they were relatively weak in numbers and equipment. German tank strength had been halved in 1940 so that the number of divisions could be doubled. Over half the tanks committed to ‘Barbarossa’ were obsolescent light tanks and Czech-built models, rather than the more capable PzKpfw III and IV. And there were virtually no reserves available. Hitler had so far refused to fully mobilise the German economy and so weapons production was inadequate. Even in mid-1941 only 250 new tanks were being built each month, insufficient to properly equip the army on the eve of a major new campaign, or keep up with the inevitable mechanical and combat losses. Hitler even chose to divert some of these to France and other theatres, when the demand was greatest in Russia. The vast majority of the 10,000 or so Russian tanks facing the Germans in June 1941 were light BT series tanks or obsolete T-26 models. Huge numbers were destroyed in poorly planned and executed counterattacks. But Soviet tank development and production was already superior to that of the Germans. A new generation of tanks had entered service, namely the T-34 and KV-1. The T-34 in particular was a major leap in tank design and came as a complete shock to the Germans when it was first encountered in July 1941. It had sloping armour – which effectively doubled its strength – and a powerful 76.2mm gun. Its reliable diesel engine gave it a good range and turn of speed, and its wide tracks could cope with mud or snow. Russian industry was already gearing up to turn it out in huge numbers. Less than a thousand T-34s were available at the start of ‘Barbarossa’ and most were squandered in piecemeal actions by half-trained crews. But the Red Army could absorb significant losses of equipment as well as men. The mass mobilisation of Soviet industry had been set in train, which included relocating vital tank, aircraft and munitions factories eastwards to the Urals. This huge logistical undertaking was already bearing fruit. It meant that despite the early defeats, the Soviet Union was far better prepared for a long war than the Germans, whose own production of tanks and other weapons would be feeble by comparison.
Reindeer graze on an airfield in Finland on July 26, 1941. In the background a German war plane takes off. German logistical problems. Logistics was another hugely important factor in the German defeat. No matter how fast or far the fighting formations advanced, they were dependent on timely supplies of fuel and ammunition. This became an ever greater problem as the army progressed deeper into Soviet territory and further away from its own railheads. Not only were the distances much greater than they had been during the French campaign, but the Soviet transport infrastructure was much poorer. German engineers struggled to convert the Russian railway gauge to one which their own locomotives and rolling stock could use. Meanwhile the multitude of lorries and horse-drawn wagons in which the supplies were transported were forced to negotiate Russian dirt roads, which became virtually impassable after prolonged rain. The debilitating effects of the weather and terrain were not properly taken into account when planning the campaign. The numerous forests, marshes and rivers slowed the advance during the summer. The autumn Rasputitsa and the onset of the brutal Russian winter brought it to a halt during Operation ‘Typhoon’. Tank and vehicle lubricants froze as temperatures plunged to record lows. Winter clothing supplies were held up in Poland, as fuel and ammunition took priority. If anything symbolises the failure of ‘Barbarossa’ it is the image of inadequately equipped German troops shivering in the snows before Moscow.
Heinrich Himmler (left, in glasses), head of the Gestapo and the Waffen-SS, inspects a prisoner-of-war camp in this from 1940-41 in Russia.
Evidence of the fierce fighting on the Moscow sector of the front is provided in this photo showing what the Germans claim to be some of the 650,000 Russian prisoners which they captured at Bryansk and Vyasma. They are here seen waiting to be transported to a prisoner of war camp somewhere in Russia, on November 2, 1941.
Adolf Hitler, center, studies a Russian war map with General Field Marshal Walter Von Brauchitsch, left, German commander in chief, and Chief of Staff Col. General Franz Halder, on August 7, 1941.
German soldiers, supported by armored personnel carriers, move into a burning Russian village at an unknown location during the German invasion of the Soviet Union, on June 26, 1941.
A huge Russian gun on tracks, likely a 203 mm howitzer M1931, is manned by its crew in a well-concealed position on the Russian front on September 15, 1941.
Rapidly advancing German forces encountered serious guerrilla resistance behind their front lines. Here, four guerrillas with fixed bayonets and a small machine gun are seen in action, near a small village.
Red Army soldiers examine war trophies captured in battles with invading Germans, somewhere in Russia, on September 19, 1941.
A view of the destruction in Riga, the capital of Latvia, on October 3, 1941, after the wave of war had passed over it, the Russians had withdrawn and it was in Nazi hands.
Five Soviet civilians on a platform, with nooses around their necks, about to be hanged by German soldiers, near the town of Velizh in the Smolensk region, in September of 1941.
A Finnish troop train passes through a scene of an earlier explosion which wrecked one train, tearing up the rails and embankment, on October 19, 1941.
Burning houses, ruins and wrecks speak for the ferocity of the battle preceding this moment when German forces entered the stubbornly defended industrial center of Rostov on the lower Don River, in Russia, on November 22, 1941.
General Heinz Guderian, commander of Germany’s Panzergruppe 2, chats with members of a tank crew on the Russian front, on September 3, 1941.
German soldiers remove one of many Soviet national emblems during their drive to conquer Russia on July 18, 1941.
A man, his wife, and child are seen after they had left Minsk on August 9, 1941, when the German army swarmed in. The original wartime caption reads, in part: “Hatred for the Nazis burns in the man’s eyes as he holds his little child, while his wife, completely exhausted, lies on the pavement”.
German officials claimed that this photo was a long-distance camera view of Leningrad, taken from the Germans’ seige lines, on October 1, 1941, the dark shapes in the sky were identified as Soviet aircraft on patrol, but were more likely barrage balloons. This would mark the furthest advance into the city for the Germans, who laid seige to Leningrad for more than two more years, but were unable to fully capture the city.
A flood of Russian armored cars move toward the front, on October 19, 1941.
German Army Commander Colonel General Ernst Busch inspects an anti-aircraft gun position, somewhere in Germany, on Sept. 3, 1941.
Finnish soldiers storm a soviet bunker on August 10, 1941. One of the Soviet bunker’s crew surrenders, left.
German troops make a hasty advance through a blazing Leningrad suburb, in Russia on November 24, 1941.
Russian prisoners of war, taken by the Germans on July 7, 1941.
A column of Russian prisoners of war taken during recent fighting in Ukraine, on their way to a Nazi prison camp on September 3, 1941.
German mechanized troops rest at Stariza, Russia on November 21, 1941, only just evacuated by the Russians, before continuing the fight for Kiev. The gutted buildings in the background testify to the thoroughness of the Russians “scorched earth” policy.
German infantrymen force their way into a snipers hide-out, where Russians had been firing upon advancing German troops, on September 1, 1941.
Two Russian soldiers, now prisoners of war, inspect a giant statue of Lenin, somewhere in Russia, torn from its pedestal and smashed by the Germans in their advance, on August 9, 1941. Note the rope round the neck of the statue, left there in symbolic fashion by the Germans.
German sources described the gloomy looking officer at the right as a captured Russian colonel who is being interrogated by Nazi officers on October 24, 1941.
Flames shoot high from burning buildings in the background as German troops enter the city of Smolensk, in the central Soviet Union, during their offensive drive onto the capital Moscow, in August of 1941.
This trainload of men was described by German sources as Soviet prisoners en route to Germany, on October 3, 1941. Several million Soviet soldiers were eventually sent to German prison camps, the majority of whom never returned alive.
Russian snipers leave their hide-out in a wheat field, somewhere in Russia, on August 27, 1941, watched by German soldiers. In foreground is a disabled soviet tank.
German infantrymen in heavy winter gear march next to horse-drawn vehicles as they pass through a district near Moscow, in November 1941. Winter conditions strained an already thin supply line, and forced Germany to halt its advance – leaving soldiers exposed to the elements and Soviet counterattacks, resulting in heavy casualties and a serious loss of momentum in the war.

Original article: Imgur
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29 thoughts on “Operation Barbarossa 1941.

  1. Dear DanielHunter279, if you can not recognise something so easy like Sd.Kfz. 253, please stay on expressions like “German halftrack in front”.

    Liked by 1 person

      1. Sorry but no Sd. Kfz. 25x variant is so easily distinguishable as 253. Maybe 252 taken from some perspective (see one of the lower photos, with its back barely visible). If he can not name it for sure, it is right to do not name it at all.

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  2. The pics are interesting, but the article itself is heavily pro-German biased, starting from the number of Russian troops, all the way to the reasons of German fail (it was NOT the number of troops, but Russian bravery and readiness to endure sacrifices that brought them final victory).

    Pls don`t post stuff like this again.

    Thx.

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    1. I mean, there were a lot of factors, as is typical of war. Saying that the war was won by the qualities of the men involved is a gross simplification that’s as biased as you claim the article to be.

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      1. Yeah, because killing your own army is a great idea in a war. Only cowards and deserters were oppressed i.e. people who were actually sabotaging the orders. In an actuall battle commissars were often on the frontlines watching troop’s morale and inspiring people. There was no point of holding people at gun point, usually they were motivated enough. Even arguably too much motivated sometimes.

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    2. @Popovic

      In fact, its because of readers like urself that this post is needed, to really understand who the russian imperials wannabes are and where they are.

      So, this been said, do you know who general was responsible for that “bravery and readiness to endure sacrificies”? And what did he ordered his men to do to halt the german offensive? Or do u think the atrocities were all german caused?

      And, BTW, one more piece of mind: this article didnt mention Gen. Model, hardcore nazi General till his suicide in 1945.

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    3. Why is the number of russian troops a biase?
      Sorry, but your post is bs and reflects your need to glorify your nation.
      No other event in younger history was analysed as often as the war in russia. Literally thousands of experts agree in reasons like: weather, limited ressources of german army, two fronts for germany, over extension of german front, again the weather, numer of soviet troops,. And you want to reduce it to bravery??? Sorry, try to learn history without listening to neo-soviet propaganda.
      There is a reason why russians lost so many men during fightings in WW2 compared to all other nations: the stupidity of soviet officers and there catastrophical leading of their men. Sending the third wave of a storm attack without weapons because assuming that they would find enough weapons of fallen comrades of first and second wave is NOT bravery but the worst case of failed leadership.

      Sorry for you. I know that you need the ideal of bravery to get some glory for your nation. But in this case you have to realize that russian army is not as glorious as you want to be it. Regardless of what putin and russian troll propaganda want to tell us.

      Liked by 1 person

    4. “but Russian bravery and readiness to endure sacrifices that brought them final victory”

      Im sure that russian soldiers was bravery and readiness, but that was not the reason for the final victory.

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  3. When talking about History itself we need to talk without emotions. The flow of history is a series of events that led to another events, that led to another and so on. From our own perspective we need to see the mistakes from the past and to make the conclusions, so that we will never repeat the same mistakes. But unfortunately the History that is teached in schools around the world is manipulated to the benefit of those who rule the specific country.The History must be objective, not grotesquely distorted.

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  4. In the post, I don’t see pro-German moods or glorification of NSDAP, the Wehrmacht or the SS, but an objective attitude to an event that took place 77 years ago.

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  5. There’s no objective attitude to things that took place 77 days ago, but sadly only the “shit” we get from propaganda. 77 years is a LOT of propaganda, hence no real objectivity.

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  6. No doubt Russian troops endured harsh reality instead of breaking – but claiming Russia won the war because they were brave doesn’t stick with me… The war from what I’ve seen was pretty much over for Germany when Russia learned from spies that Japan was not planning to attack Russia so Stalin could free additional 30 divisions and move them against Germany and the spies that told them exactly how and when Germany would put in their last offensive. I’d say numbers, weather, timing and intelligence (spies) had the bigger impact on the result than bravery

    Liked by 2 people

  7. Wrong. Operation Barbarossa was NOT a German invasion of the USSR, it was an AXIS invasion. There were almost 1 million Romanians, along with many Italians and Hungarians, and if I’m not wrong, also Croats and Slovaks. Then, there were also the Finns and volunteers from places like Spain. Saying it’s a “German invasion” is so wrong.

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    1. David, please, come on. Without the initiative of the germans, the other wouldnt have joined. Also there were no single generals of the axis members involved in the plannings. While we all know that there were more nations involved, we can for sure say it was a german plan and operation.

      Liked by 1 person

  8. I think we all know that USSR received a lot of help from the Allies while Germany was pretty fucked in this regard. Third Reich bit more than it can chew and sorely miscalculated. They lost their edge in weapon department very soon and were not ready to face the horrors that Soviet land prepared for them. There was a lot of factors to the victory and it’s a very impressive feat nonetheless.

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  9. This post is very interesting. We can always argue that one side is good the other side is bad or told the counter argument is too biased. But i think we can all agree that wars is horrible thing. The damage it left behind was unimaginable. The lesson need to learn in history is always to understand the pass in order to us have a better future. Don’t you agree?

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    1. War can be also seen as an uncivilized way to clarify conflicts of interest. A civilized way would be to settle these conflicts by law and with help of court. Unfortunately many nations/culture does not respect the authority of law. See russians claims regarding ukraine or turkey as example. Like turkey, saudi-arabia and katar try to achieve their claims regarding the religious domination of their sunni-religion over the shia religion with the help of isis.

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  10. On the german side, WW1 and WW2 were decided basically by just one head (Kaiser,/Hitler) and that was mainly the reason why these huge decisions werent well reasoned and consequently they where doomed to fail imo.

    Liked by 1 person

      1. Well, to begin WW1 was quite stupid, because germany lived like in a paradise before: they did receive reparations because of the won war against france 1871 (which was justified because of oppression of germany by france before). The money flooding from france was one reason of the prosperity of germany in these years (“Gründerzeit”). There was no justification and it was just insane of the Kaiser to begin a war. There was no reason for it and shortly after 1914, the Kaiser asked himself why the heck he started this mess in the first place. Just one brain isnt enough to thought out such a huge decision. Other countries, like gb or usa did ask their parlaments before joining war (WW1 and WW2)

        Its similar with WW2: only one man in germany decided to begin the war. Technical excellence and bravery of the fighting germans does not lead to victory if the the reason for war are not strong founded and thought out.

        Liked by 1 person

        1. Bismarck was right. But I think the Polish opression of the German minority was a good „official” enough reason. Nevertheless, the 2nd war went really smoothly at first, the problems were the „no retreat” policy which was dumbly enforced, the invasion of Yugoslavia and then keeping too many troops there plus nobody telling Japan to not attack USA. USSR was also planning to invade Germany. I wouldn’t care anyway if the 2nd war would be won by the Axis, because my country (Romania) would invade Hungary again to remove the 2nd Vienna Award.

          One thing I hate though, is that Austria isn’t allowed to unify with Germany and also I dislike the ethnic cleansing done to Sudeten Germans.

          Liked by 1 person

          1. Well regarding war strategy it was again a problem, that Hitler tried to teach the generals what to do, so Hitler was not a military expert and he should shut up instead he might thought of himself as a second Alexander or Napoleon lol.

            Liked by 1 person

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