Historical Articles - The Armored Patrol

Success Stories

The history of World War II shows that capturing tanks could come in handy when you lack armour or firepower, and one very good example would be the

VII

Panther .

This tank is considered one of the strongest machines produced during the conflict, and ironically enough, many countries used it against its German creators.


On the left: one of the first Panthers captured by the French, in March 1944. On the right: the 503rd French Regiment Manoeuvres with Panther Tanks, in 1947.

In October 1944, Canadian forces captured an intact Panther in Italy and called it “The Deserter“. It was used during multiple assaults, including one against a German observation post before it was sent out of the front to be studied. A few months later, in January 1945, the British also found an abandoned Panther in a barn and decided to use it to push through the Netherlands villages. Christened “Cuckoo” this Panther was wearing the khaki of the British

Churchill VII and fought during the battle of Geijsteren Castle and Operation Blackcock.

By Squire – major thanks!

As the United States Army contemplated shifting operations to western Europe in the waning months of 1943, confusion settled in about how to employ tank destroyers. The deserts of North Africa, it seems, steered thinking in a bizarre direction. Haunted by the poor performance of the half-track M3 while impressed by the British employment of dug-in anti-tank guns, the U.S. Army, under the influence of Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, began to value the towed tank destroyer over its self-propelled brethren.

According to a report of the General Board convened in 1945 to study the effectiveness of U.S. forces in the European Theater, “those officers who had been through the African Campaign, who had become indoctrinated with the British defense against armor, and who had seen the impossibility of concealing the self-propelled gun in open terrain, requested towed tank destroyer battalions.” Indeed, as late as December 1943, the U.S. Army issued an order converting twenty self-propelled battalions to towed to achieve a more balanced force. It also changed trans-Atlantic shipping priorities to increase the number of towed battalions in England in advance of the Normandy invasion. This change reflected a remarkable shift in emphasis just months before the Overlord campaign.

The decision, however, failed both to appreciate the latest developments in tank destroyer technology and anticipate the impact of terrain on tactical employment. By mid-July 1943, the M10 tank destroyer, equipped with a 3-inch gun, largely replaced the M3 halftrack Gun Motor Carriage, equipped with a 75-mm cannon. The M10 offered a protection and mobility with which neither the halftrack nor its towed counterpart could compete. Boasting the same 3-inch firepower, towed anti-tank battalions lacked protection and required considerable time to emplace and displace. Nevertheless, placed along predictable avenues of approach in the open desert, the towed guns could prove remarkably effective.

Perhaps predictably, the Louisiana maneuvers in 1943 and training in England in early 1944 exposed the flaws in this approach to tank destroyer employment. Requiring additional time to unload and enter action, the towed guns, along with their prime movers—the trucks responsible for transporting them—appeared excessively vulnerable to enemy fire. Reacting to these observations, planners reversed course and subsequently reduced the role of towed anti-tank units in the initial invasion force to just one battalion.

Combat in the hedgerow country quickly reaffirmed the value of the self-propelled tank destroyer, or at least the inutility of towed systems. The towed guns struggled to shoot direct fire engagements over the hedgerows and lacked the armor required to push forward aggressively where the vegetation and terrain allowed for fields of fire. Additionally, infantry commanders disliked the towed guns’ comparative lack of mobility once in position and their general lack of firepower.

Within a month of landing at Normandy, even the self-propelled M10 failed to meet commanders’ demands for firepower. Just two months prior, the U.S. Army in Europe had rejected offers to replace M10s with the newer M36 sporting a 90mm gun. By July 6, 1944, however, it requested that all M10 battalions be converted to M36s and asked that any future tank destroyer organizations be equipped with either the M18 or M36.

Two images are intended to show the difference in terrain: